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WEST VIRGINIA
dissents17 so that, despite suggestions of broadened principles of interpretation, there is still some prospect of success for the states in continuing to rely primarily on claims for strict interpretation of statutes.
The powers of congress as presently conceived' 8 make it much more
unlikely that the Court will hold an act unconstitutional than that it
may in a specific case apply a rule of "express application," under
which congress would be called on for express and unequivocal reference. A settled practice of that tenor on the part of congress would
in any case be desirable as relieving the Court of consideration of matD.C. C., JR.
ters of policy not properly within its domain.'
CASE COMMENTS
CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS-DuTY OF AGENT TO RECONVEY LAND
PURCHASED FOR PRINCIPAL-STATUTE OF FRAUDS.-Plaintiff seeks to

recover realty, formerly belonging to him, which he alleges defendant,
his brother, had bought at a judicial sale, on an oral agreement to reconvey to plaintiff at such time as plaintiff should be financially able to redeem it on payment of the purchase price plus interest. Both parties attempted to suppress bidding before the sale in order that defendant might
purchase. Defendant took possession and held the property for approximately ten years after which he refused to reconvey on tender of the purchase price. The circuit court entered a decree for redemption of the
realty upon payment of a sum to be fixed by an accounting. Held, that
such oral agreement was unenforceable (1) as an oral contract for the
sale of land within the Statute of Frauds, W. VA. REV. CODE (Michie,
1943) c. 36, art. 1, §3, (2) as an oral declaration of trust within the Statute of Frauds, W. VA. REv. CODE (Michie, 1943) c. 36, art. 1, §4, (3) as

not being within the permissible provisions of the statute allowing an
'7 See the dissents of Mr. Justice Murphy in Pacific Coast Dairy v. Department of Agriculture of California, 318 U. S. 285, 303, 63 S. Ct. 628, 634, 87
L. ed. 761, 771 (1942), and Mr. Justice Roberts in California v. United States,
320 U. S. 577, 586, 64 S. Ct. 352, 357, 88 L. ed. 322, 331 (1943).
Is See e. g., Stewart Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U. S. 548, 57 S. Ct. 883, 81.
L. ed. 1279 (1937); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U. S. 111o 63 S. Ct. 82, 87 L. ed.

122 (1942); CORWIN, THE CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY (8th

ed. 1946) 42, 143.
19 See Penn Dairies v. Milk Control Comm., 318 U. S. 261, 275, 63 S. Ct.
617, 623, 87 L. ed. 748, 757 (1942) ("An unexpressed purpose of Congress to
set aside statutes of the states regulating their internal affairs is not lightly to be
inferred and ought not to be implied where the legislative command, read in the
light of its history, remains ambiguous . . . Court should guard against resolving these competing considerations of policy by imputing to Congress a decision
which quite clearly it has not undertaken to make"); Davis Warehouse Co. v.
Bowles, 321 U. S. 144, 152, 64 S. Ct. 474, 479, 88 L. ed. 635, 641 (1944)
("Where Congress has not clearly indicated a purpose to precipitate conflict
(between state and federal governments) we should be reluctant to do so by
decision").
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oral express trust, ibid., and (4) under an invocation of the "clean
hands" doctrine, both parties having participated in the suppression of
bidding. Decree reversed and bill dismissed. Dye v. Dye, 39 S. B. (2d)
98 (W. Va. 1946).
On all four grounds the case is soundly decided. But a dictum in the
case reaffirms a questionable West Virginia doctrine that, in case of an
oral agency for the purchase of land, the agent, who, with his own money,
in violation of his agency, purchases land in his own name, cannot be
compelled to convey the land to his principal "as that would be in violation of the statute of frauds." Nash v. Yones, 41 W. Va. 769, 24 S. E. 592
(1896). Starting from the proposition that one who has been an agent
for another in pre-existing transactions to buy land cannot purchase
realty for himself in violation of his agency, a constructive trust arising
upon breach of the fiduciary relationship which exists between such an
agent and his principal, the same problem arises when one orally designated as agent for one particular transaction purchases realty with his
own funds for himself. On the question of whether such an oral contract
of agency is enforceable, there is a division of authority. Some jurisdictions, like West Virginia, have adhered to a strict enforcement of the
Statute of Frauds. Thus the early English view, since overruled, Bartlett
v. Pickersgill, 1 Eden 515, 1 Cox 15, 4 East 577n. (1759), overruled by
Heard v. Pilley, L. R. 4 Ch. App. 548 (1869), and Rochefoucald v.
Boustead, 1 Ch. 196 (1897), followed by a minority of the states; Nash
v. Yones, 41 W. Va.769, 24 S. B. 592 (1896) ; Douglasv. Bemis, 95 Minn.
220, 103 N. W. 882 (1905) ; Partridgev. Cummings, 99 N. J. Eq. 14, 131
Atl. 683 (1926). But see Miller v. Kyle, 107 Kan. 368, 191 Pac. 492
(1920), has refused to enforce such oral agreements, declaring them to
violate the statute which requires written contracts for the sale of land.
The agency problem is ignored, or at most, failure to enforce is held to result in mere breach of contract. Mays v. Perry, 196 Ga. 729, 27 S. E. (2d)
698 (1943) ; Rose v. FallRiver Five Cents SavingsBank, 165 Mass. 273,
43 N. B. 93 (1896) ; GatesHotel Co. v. Davis Real Estate Co., 331 Mo.
94, 52 S. W. (2d) 1011 (1932). Stress is placed on the notion that enforcement would virtually abrogate the Statute of Frauds. The majority
view does not allow the Statute of Frauds to bar establishment of a constructive trust enforceable in a court of equity, Harropv. Cole, 85 N. J.
Eq. 32, 95 Atl. 378 (1914), aft'd, 86 N. J. Eq. 25, 98 Atl. 1085 (1916) ;
Krzysko v. Gaudynski, 207 Wis. 308, 242 N. W. 186 (1932); 3 Scorr,
TRUSTS (1939) §499, reasoning that when one assumes to act as agent
for another who reposes confidence in him, a fiduciary relationship arises
and that the agent's violation of fiduciary duty gives rise to a construc-
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tive trust. Quinn v. Phipps,93 Fla. 805, 113 So. 419 (1927) ; 3 SCOTT,
TRUSTS §499. Other grounds defeating strict application of the Statute
of Frauds have been constructive trusts based on a.special confidential
relationship between the parties involved, Kersey v. Kersey, 76 W. Va.
70, 85 S.E. 22 (1915) (brother) ; Harrasv. Harras,60 Wash. 258, 110
Pac. 105 (1910) (same) ; Yackson v. Strader,61 W.Va. 161,56 S. E. 177
(1907) (attorney) ; Broder v. Conklin, 78 Cal. 330, 19 Pac. 513 (1888)
(same); Raines v. Raines, 96 W. Va. 65, 122 S. E. 437 (1924) (parent
and child) ; Pope v. Depray, 176 Ill. 478, 52 N. E. 58 (1898) (same);
Sinclairv. Purdy, 235 N. Y. 245, 139 N. E. 255 (1923) (brother and sister) ; Fisherv. Grady, 131 Fla. 1, 178 So. 852 (1937) (nephew), characterizing the purchaser a trustee ex maleficio, 4 WMISTON, CONTRACTS
(Rev. ed. 1936) §1024; cf. Gates Hotel Co. v. Davis Real Estate Co.,
331 Mo. 94, 52 S. W. (2d) 1011 (1932); Kellum v. Smith, 33 Pa. 158
(1859), or invoking the equities involved in cases of suppressed bidding.
Holman v. Kirby, 198 Ark. 326, 128 S. W. 357 (1939); Hartzell v.
Whitmore, 271 Pa. 575, 115 Atl. 840 (1922) ; Walraven v. Lock, 2 Pat.
& H. 547 (Va. 1857). The result seems to depend on whether the court
is more impressed by the transaction as being one involving real estate,
a traditional concern of the Statute of Frauds, or by the agency elements,
leading it to recognize that breach of the duty imposed by the oral
agency violates the fiduciary relationship and creates a constructie trust
which arises by operation of law; and as such is expressly excepted from
the operation of the statute. W. VA. REv. CODE (Michie, 1943) c. 36,
art. 1, §4 ("Provided, however, that trusts arising by construction or
operation of law shall not be subject to the provisions of this section.')
Such a trust is independent of and unaffected by the problem of the
oral agreement of such an agent to convey, which violates the Statute of
Frauds. Matney v. Tates, 121 Va. 506, 93 S. E. 694 (1917) ; 4 WILLisTON, CONTRACTS §1024. To the argument against existence of a constructive trust that the agent is guilty of a mere breach of contract, it may
be answered that the very breach reveals a fraudulent intent to obtain
the property for himself. The trend of more recent American cases toward enforcing a constructive trust against the agent, Stromerson v.
Averill, 22 Cal. (2d) 808, 141 P. (2d) 732 (1943); Stephenson v.
Golden, 279 Mich. 710, 276 N. W. 849 (1937) ; Harropv. Cole, 85 N. J.
Eq. 32, 95 Atl. 378 (1914), aft'd, 86 N. J. Eq. 25, 98 Atl. 1085 (1916),
the growing opposition to allowing the Statute of Frauds to operate as a
shield for the perpetration of fraud, 3 SCOTT, TRUSTS §499; 4 WmusTON, CONTRACTS §1024; Feezer, Constructive Trusts in Cases of
Agency to Buy Real Estate (1933) 17 MINN. L. Rav. 755, and the
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preference for the tonstructive trust analysis by the American Law Institute, RESTATEMENT, AGENCY (1933) §414(2); R.ESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION (1937) §194(2), unite in opposing the use of the Statute of
Frauds by a dishonest agent to secure for himself land purchased under
an orally created agency. It is submitted that the constructive trust approach is the sounder in this situation.
M. S. K.
EQUITY-REMOVAL OF CLOUD ON TITLE-RGHT TO BRING SUIT
WHEN DEFENDANT HAS POSSEssION.-Plaintiff corporation sued in

equity to remove cloud on title to a tract of which defendants were in
actual possession. Defendants had gone into possession as tenants of
plaintiff's grantor, and defended under a claim of hostile possession under unrecorded instruments, the nature of which was unknown to plaintiff. Decree for plaintiff. Held, that under the governing statute, equity
has jurisdiction to remove a cloud on title even though defendant is in
actual possession of the property. United Thacker Coal Co. v.Newsome,
38 S.E. (2d) 660 (W. Va. 1946).
Independently of statute, a bill to remove cloud on title to real
estate could be maintained only by one in actual possession. Yones v. McKenzie, 122 Fed. 390 (C. C. A. 8th, 1903) ; Hansford v. Rust, 107 W. Va.
624, 150 S.E. 223 (1929) ; Yackson v. Cook, 71 W. Va. 210, 76 S. E. 443
(1912). But cf. HOGG, EQUITY PLEADING & PRACTICE (Carlin's ed. 1929)
§122 (exceptions in cases involving suits to cancel tax deeds, estates in
remainder, or where equitable title only is asserted). It did not lie when
neither party was in possession. Sansom v. Blankenship, 53 W. Va. 411,
44 S.E. 408 (1903). At law, ejectment is the proper remedy when defendant is in actual possession or claims title thereto or some interest
therein. W. VA. CODE (Michie, 1943) c. 55, art. 4, §5. In West Virginia,
by statute, questions of cloud on title to real property may be determined
"without allegation or proof of actual possession of the same." Id. at c.
51, art. 2, §2. Italics supplied. (The statute was adopted in 1929.) The
effect of the statute has been considered in three cases. The decision in
Flynn Coal& Lumber Co. v. White Lumber Corp., 110 W. Va. 262, 15
S. E. 588 (1931), was based on plaintiff's actual possession, but the court
said, by way of dictum, that, under the statute, such possession would
not be necessary. In PocahontasCoal & Coke Co. v. Bower, 111 W. Va.
712, 163 S. E. 421 (1932), neither party was in actual possession and
plaintiff was allowed to maintain an action to remove cloud; the court,
basing its decision squarely on the statute, said that it "merely declares in
effect, that whereas, formerly a suit to remove cloud could be maintained
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